




The crisis of the pensions system in Europe is primar-
ily a demographic crisis, resulting from falling fertility
and increasing longevity. Fertility rates fell from
2.1 children per female in the 1970s to 1.7 children per
female in the 1990s, and they are not expected to pick
up again in the future. The problem is compounded
by increasing longevity. The ratio of people above
65 to people between 15 and 65 (one way to measure
the so-called dependency ratio) in most European
countries is expected to more than double, on average,
in the EU countries between now and 2050. In per-
centage terms, such a ratio is expected to rise by at
least 60 percent in the case of the UK, up to 125 per-
cent in the case of Italy. In 2050 the dependency ratio
is projected to be around 70 percent in Italy and
Spain; between 45 and 50 percent in Germany and
France; and just below 40 percent in the UK. Changes
in the dependency ratio are expected to be even more
dramatic for the newly acceded countries – currently
featuring relatively young populations, but expected
to follow the same demographic pattern as the rest of
Europe at a very fast pace.
The magnitude of the demographic crisis is strikingly
similar across countries. But its impact on pension
systems differs depending on the structure and gen-
erosity of these systems. In some countries, the issue is
amplified by other sources of macroeconomic fragili-
ty, namely, fiscal problems. A proper assessment of
public pension liabilities needs to account for contin-
gent implicit debt that derives from implicit guaran-
tees of the welfare of pensioners (minimum pension,
bailouts of bankrupt private funds and so forth). 
From a fiscal perspective, addressing the pension cri-
sis requires reforms of the public social security sys-
tems in light of demographic dynamics that were not
foreseen at the time when the systems were intro-
duced.1 In many countries, demographic develop-
ments have been irresponsibly ignored for at least
three decades in most countries. The extent of
required reforms varies across countries, but in most
cases radical steps are needed in reconsidering the
coverage of the public systems, the degree of redistri-
bution and fairness within the system, and the average
level of benefits. It is also necessary to reduce or pre-
vent altogether the abuse of social security as an
improper instrument of industrial or redistributive
policy.
It is important to note that balancing the public pen-
sion system from an accounting perspective does not
automatically imply that the system is optimal, nor
moving towards optimality. Therefore, it is important
to focus the debate on what the desirable characteris-
tics of a pension system should be.
From a macroeconomic perspective, fewer workers
relative to non-active people means that, for a given
productivity, domestic output is on average lower
than it would be if there was a younger population.
Even if the government takes the necessary steps to
ensure fiscal sustainability, it would still be true that
citizens will face the challenge to maintain and raise
their average standard of living. There is a trade-off
between consumption and leisure: either people
should work longer and/or save more to accumulate
more human and physical capital, or living standards
should fall relative to the economy’s productivity
trend.
In light of these considerations, addressing the pen-
sion crisis entails much more than quantitative fiscal
policy: it also requires the design of policies that cre-
ate incentives (or remove disincentives) to innovate
and finance innovations, to participate in the labour
force, etc.  In designing fiscal measures, microeco-
nomic and incentive-related issues play a dominant
role.
When addressing social security issues, distribution
and efficiency are strictly interconnected: any propos-
al of reforms will involve some trade-offs between dif-
ferent objectives, shifting the incidence and magni-
tude of distortions in different areas of the economy,
1 See for instance Oksanen (2003, 2004) among others.including the labour and financial markets, but also
fertility choice. An analysis of the principles that
should guide reforms needs to focus on the relevant
trade-offs, rather than addressing each distortion on
its own.
In this chapter, we reconsider the root of the current
crisis in the social security systems in Europe, stress-
ing its macroeconomic dimensions. We then consider
different proposals to reform the system.2
2. The demographic challenge to pension systems
Table 4.1 and the Appendix convey the striking
dimension of the demographic challenge to social
security in an immediate way. In 2050, the lowest old-
age dependency ratio (ratio of people above 65 to peo-
ple between 15 and 65) is projected to climb just above
30 percent for the US and the UK. Currently, the
highest dependency ratio – recorded for Italy – is
below that figure.3 For the EU-15, the average depen-
dency ratio is currently 21 percent. It will more than
double, to about 50 percent in 2050. Strikingly, these
averages are essentially identical for the newly acced-
ed countries as a group. 
Even within Europe, individual countries differ in the
extent of the demographic change. Due to very low
fertility rates, the situation is extremely alarming for
Italy and Spain, which are expected to achieve the
highest dependency ratios – close to Japan. On the
other side of the spectrum, there are Denmark,
Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK, which are quite
far from those levels. Yet with dependency ratios
around 40 percent, the situation is critical enough.
It should be noted that a somewhat different picture
evolves when one looks at completed fertility rates,
calculated using the number of children during a
woman’s reproductive lifetime. Completed fertility
rate is sometimes around or above two. This means
that part of the observed low fertility rates in many
European countries is a transitory phenomenon, due
to the fact that women currently in their reproductive




Why a social security system?
Why not leave retirement saving decisions to individuals rather than organising mandatory public systems or private
systems strictly regulated by law? There are four main arguments.
Historically, the argument was to avoid undesirable behaviour within a family. Either rotten children refuse to take care
of their parents – an argument invoked by Bismarck – or parents may free ride on the altruism of their children, and
consume too much, without taking any measures to sustain their lives as retired people. Free riding on the altruism of 
others may also have a collective dimension if people expect help from the community in case of need in their old age.
This is nothing but a well-understood moral hazard issue in setting up the welfare state.
A different and most powerful argument stresses myopia in savings behaviour. A wealth of empirical evidence suggests
that people start to save for their retirement at a quite advanced age – raising an issue as of whether this would lead to
irrational under-saving. A mandatory pension system would therefore be a paternalistic measure to force myopic
workers to protect themselves, and save enough for their own good.
A recent view stresses that people do not make life-time plans or revise their plans at different stages of their life in an
inconsistent way. In particular, people seem to use a higher discount rate for the near future than for the far future. As a
consequence, although they care about their retirement, they end up postponing the beginning of a serious savings plan.
It is interesting to note that, while this view is shared by many economists and policy analysts, projection models set up
to calculate welfare improvements from pension reform almost never account for individuals with such characteristics;
see Angeletos et al. (2001) and Choi et al. (2002). However, one could note that what this argument really calls for –
instead of a public pension system – is the existence of illiquid assets which would allow people to commit not to dissave.
A third set of arguments refers to inefficiency and limitations of financial markets. An efficient market for annuities –
where people can convert their pension funds accumulated throughout their working life into a stream of monthly
payments up to their death – is an essential element of saving for retirement. It is well known that such markets may not 
work well because of adverse selection problems and because the size of the financial intermediary that would provide
annuities would be too large, thus granting monopoly power. However, the adverse selection argument may be
overstated, as characteristics that affect life expectancy are well observable. Moreover, the performance of a private
market for annuities should be assessed against the yield of public pension systems.
A fourth argument is that a pay-as-you-go pension system insures people against not having children. In principle people
could be sustained in their old age by their children. However, some people cannot have children either for biological
reasons or because they do not find an appropriate partner. The public pension system can be seen as a device to protect 
these people against low income in old age. This argument is particularly strong when capital markets are inadequately
developed so that only children are a realistic means to ensure sufficient resources in old age. However, the argument
would hold through even with perfect capital markets insofar as education offers infra-marginal returns above the
market rate of interest – implying families with children are better off. Note that this view presupposes a commitment by
children to sustain their parents, to which they may not agree. With a pay-as-you-go pension system, a similar duty is
extended to the society as a whole. In any case, it is necessary for a society to produce enough members of future
generations so as to sustain the needs of its members.
2 A useful glossary of pension terms and a taxonomy can be found
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/4/2496718.pdf and
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/23/2488707.pdf, respectively
3 The same picture emerges if one looks at the dependency ratio
including young people of a non-working age (0–15), although the
deterioration of this indicator appears less dramatic.EEAG Report 71
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to previous generations. So the low fertility rates in
the data reflect the coexistence of older cohorts who
have already completed their fertility, with younger
cohorts who have not yet reached their peak rates,
which is expected to occur at a higher age than for
older cohorts. This point is well illustrated by means
of simulations for a “typical”European country. As a
benchmark, we consider the case in which the fertility
rate is 2.1 with a peak in fertility for women between
20 and 30 years old: in our simulations for this case,
dependency ratios in the long run would equal
33.9 percent, i.e. they would be barely affected. They
would be somewhat higher than current dependency
ratios only because of lower mortality rates among
pensioners. Against the above scenario, suppose that
the fertility rate were to fall to 1.3, leaving the peak of
fertility for women between 20 and 30 years old:
dependency ratios would then go up to 54 percent in
the long run – and population would shrink by
1.3 percent a year. Finally, suppose the fertility rate
were to remain at 2.1 but women experienced a peak
in fertility between 28 and 38: in this case the long-run
dependency ratio would be 34.0 percent, remaining
virtually unchanged relative to the benchmark above.4
Yet the current demographic indicators would record
a temporary deterioration.
However, one should not count too much on a recov-
ery of fertility. While it is true that in some countries
completed fertility is around 2 (the UK, Norway, and
France) for the latest available cohorts, that is, those
born in 1960, it is only equal to 1.6 in Germany, 1.7 in
Italy, and 1.5 in Greece.5 Furthermore, it is likely that
cohorts born after 1960 will have even fewer children.
Otherwise, it would be very difficult to explain the
observed age pyramids, with cohort size steadily going
down with the date of birth. Because the most numer-
ous cohorts are those between 30 and 40 years of age,
if these cohorts had their maximum fertility in these
ages, we should currently observe much higher birth
rates. In principle, one could explain the currently low
birth rate if these cohorts had their fertility peaks
below 30 years of age, while younger cohorts of
women ones have later peaks. But if this were the case,
birth rates should have been much higher than
observed ten years ago.
Table 4.1
Dependency ratios in selected countries





















1950 2004 2025 2050
Austria 0.5 0.16 0.47 0.24 0.56 0.36 0.79 0.55
Belgium 0.47 0.16 0.53 0.27 0.62 0.37 0.74 0.47
Cyprus 0.68 0.1 0.5 0.18 0.58 0.29 0.66 0.39
Czech
Republic
0.48 0.12 0.41 0.2 0.55 0.35 0.84 0.59
Denmark 0.55 0.14 0.51 0.23 0.6 0.35 0.68 0.42
Estonia 0.57 0.17 0.46 0.24 0.56 0.33 0.84 0.57
Finland 0.58 0.11 0.5 0.23 0.67 0.41 0.72 0.46
France 0.52 0.17 0.53 0.25 0.63 0.36 0.73 0.46
Germany 0.49 0.14 0.49 0.27 0.6 0.38 0.76 0.49
Greece 0.55 0.11 0.5 0.28 0.57 0.38 0.88 0.62
Hungary 0.48 0.11 0.44 0.22 0.53 0.32 0.75 0.5
Ireland 0.65 0.18 0.47 0.17 0.54 0.25 0.69 0.41
Italy 0.53 0.13 0.5 0.29 0.59 0.4 0.9 0.65
Latvia 0.57 0.18 0.46 0.24 0.54 0.33 0.82 0.56
Lithuania 0.58 0.15 0.49 0.22 0.55 0.3 0.74 0.43
Luxembourg 0.42 0.14 0.49 0.21 0.5 0.25 0.62 0.35
Malta 0.69 0.1 0.47 0.19 0.63 0.36 0.73 0.46
Netherlands 0.59 0.12 0..48 0.21 0.58 0.33 0.68 0.42
Poland 0.53 0.08 0.42 0.18 0.53 0.31 0.75 0.5
Portugal 0.57 0.11 0.49 0.24 0.53 0.32 0.79 0.53
Slovakia 0.55 0.1 0.41 0.16 0.5 0.27 0.73 0.47
Slovenia 0.53 0.11 0.42 0.21 0.56 0.38 0.89 0.64
Spain 0.52 0.11 0.45 0.25 0.53 0.35 0.93 0.68
Sweden 0.51 0.15 0.54 0.27 0.67 0.4 0.73 0.47
UK 0.49 0.16 0.52 0.24 0.56 0.31 0.65 0.38
Japan 0.68 0.08 0.5 0.29 0.7 0.5 0.98 0.72
US 0.54 0.13 0.51 0.18 0.6 0.28 0.31 0.32
Source: United Nations; Population Division, 2004; EEAG.
4 If the completed fertility rate is, say, 1.7 instead of 2.1, then post-
ponement of child-bearing actually slightly reduces dependency
ratios in the long run, from 0.435 to 0.42.
5 Source: Eurostat,
http://www.un.org/esa/population/pubsarchive/gubhaju/table7.htm3. Some unpleasant growth arithmetic
To convey the implications of adverse demographic
developments in an immediate way, it is useful to build
a simple numerical example showing the implications
of ageing for a country’s productive capacity. In partic-
ular, assume that workers’ productivity growth is two
percent per year in EU-15 as well as in Japan and the
US, while it is 2.5 percent in the new EU states. Assume
also that the participation rate in the labor force is
either constant at the current rate, or increases from the
current rate up to 80 percent in 2050: for European
countries this implies eight percentage points average
rise in participation. Based on this assumption, we cal-
culate the change in per capita output for the popula-
tion above the age of 15. This measure of per capita
output is a rough measure of output available for
workers and retired people. Needless to say, the results
are very sensitive to the parameters assumed in the
exercise. Results are shown in Table 4.2.
As our benchmark, consider a hypothetical situation
with no ageing. For the EU-15, other things equal, a
two percent productivity growth per year would raise
average output per adult by a factor of 2.44 between
2004 and 2005. Accounting for population ageing,
however, the same average output only grows by a fac-
tor of 1.63. This figure is raised to 1.82 if substantial
gains in the participation rate are achieved (that is,
more people of working age actually do work). Note
that, relative to the scenario with no adverse demo-
graphic development, these average figures are equiv-
alent to a productivity slowdown (for a given popula-
tion structure) from 2 to 1.1 or 1.3 percent per year.
The outlook is particularly grim in Italy, Spain and
Greece. In the case of Spain, for instance, a two per-
cent productivity growth barely compensates for the
projected population ageing, implying a quasi-stagna-
tion of output per capita. Even when extreme gains in
participation rates are assumed, income gains are only
of the order of 50 percent over the 45-year period.
Table 4.2 shows that raising participation rates does
make a difference. If the gain in participation rate is
achieved via a delay in retirement age, this result is just
a way to reiterate that the impact
of longevity on the pension sys-
tem can be mitigated by adjusting
the retirement age. Figure 4.1,
taken from the OECD, shows a
wide dispersion in the average
effective retirement age for male
workers across countries in 2000,
which varies between 56 and 62.6
There are two main lessons from
our numerical example. First, in
the next few decades, when the
impact of demographic changes
on pension systems will be at its
peak, raising retirees’ living stan-
dard in line with productivity will
only be possible if the economy as
a whole consumes its wealth, i.e.
consumes its stock of domestic

















Austria 0.24 0.55 80.00 1.44 1.44 2.44
Belgium 0.27 0.47 67.00 1.77 2.11 2.44
Denmark 0.23 0.42 81.00 1.84 1.81 2.44
Finland 0.23 0.46 74.00 1.71 1.85 2.44
France 0.25 0.46 70.00 1.76 2.01 2.44
Germany 0.27 0.49 76.00 1.70 1.79 2.44
Greece 0.28 0.62 66.00 1.29 1.56 2.44
Ireland 0.17 0.41 70.00 1.73 1.98 2.44
Italy 0.29 0.65 63.00 1.20 1.53 2.44
Luxembourg 0.21 0.35 67.00 2.01 2.40 2.44
Netherlands 0.21 0.42 70.00 1.79 2.05 2.44
Portugal 0.24 0.53 76.00 1.51 1.59 2.44
Spain 0.25 0.68 71.00 1.04 1.17 2.44
Sweden 0.27 0.47 76.00 1.77 1.86 2.44
UK 0.24 0.38 76.00 1.99 2.09 2.44
EU 15-
Average 0.24 0.49 72.20 1.64 1.82 2.44
Cyprus 0.18 0.39 NA 2.26 - 3.04
Czech
Republic
0.2 0.59 NA 1.56 - 3.04
Estonia 0.24 0.57 NA 1.72 - 3.04
Hungary 0.22 0.5 NA 1.95 - 3.04
Latria 0.24 0.56 NA 1.76 - 3.04
Lithuania 0.22 0.43 NA 2.22 - 3.04
Malta 0.19 0.46 NA 2.03 - 3.04
Poland 0.18 0.5 NA 1.85 - 3.04
Slovakia 0.16 0.47 NA 1.92 - 3.04
Slovenia 0.21 0.64 NA 1.38 - 3.04
Average 0.21 0.51 NA 1.86 - 3.04
Japan 0.29 0.72 78.00 0.96 0.99 2.44
US 0.18 0.32 85.00 2.02 2.16 2.44
Note: NA: not available
Source: EEAG.
6 The new EU members states suffer
markedly from the rapid deterioration of
the demographic outlook. In some of our
examples, average income per adult is 50
per cent of what it could be for a stable
population structure. For Japan, our exer-
cise suggests quasi stagnation: annual
productivity growth of two per cent is not
enough to compensate for population
ageing in terms of average resources,
although the level of income in this coun-
try is high in absolute terms to start with.
A relatively better demography explains
the relatively good outlook for the US.EEAG Report 73
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example clearly shows the large extent to which the
decline in working-age population offsets output gains
from productivity growth. The transition to a new sta-
ble population is likely to coincide with large decumula-
tion of aggregate wealth stocks, especially starting in the
2030s, when the baby boomers born in the mid-1960s
will receive their pensions.7 Making sure that our
economies arrive at that time with a sufficiently large
endowment of domestic and foreign capital is a neces-
sary condition to prevent a crisis and manage economic
and social issues that could possibly arise in the process.
Second, while running down the stock of national
wealth will help smooth consumption during the tran-
sition to a new stable population structure, consuming
capital stock cannot, however, be a permanent solu-
tion to the pension crisis. A higher stock of capital
(human and physical) per worker is instead required
in the long run when the population structure stabilis-
es, reflecting lower fertility and increasing longevity. A
higher capital per worker raises productivity levels
and sustains living standards.
4. Issues facing the design of a pension system 
We now discuss major issues that, in our view, should be
policy priorities in dealing with pension reform. These
issues are often overlooked or misunderstood, and they
inform the current debate on social security systems vir-
tually in all European countries, despite the differences
across national systems. In Europe,
there is a wide variety of pension
institutions, ranging from purely
redistributive pay-as-you-go sys-
tems, to systems with an important
funded component. Many coun-
tries are undertaking pension
reforms that develop social securi-
ties in different directions, not only
because there are differences in
existing pension institutions and
macroeconomic conditions but
also because reforms may be
inspired by alternative principles.
In what follows, we will focus on a
few general dimensions of pension
reforms and then analyze possible
solutions to the issues raised.8
4.1 Fairness
“Equity” is a central concern of redistributive poli-
cies. Yet in many dimensions, equity concerns are
ignored in designing these policies and reforming
them. As far as pensions are concerned, there are
inequities between individuals of the same generation
as well as inequities between generations.
Intragenerational inequities come from not taking
individual preferences and characteristics into
account. Those who systematically have a lower life
expectancy, for example, because of their occupation,
gender, or other observable characteristics, do not
earn a higher pension per period.9 If their pensions
were managed by a private insurance company, it
would offer them a higher return on their pension
wealth than to other agents, because it is known that
this return would have to be paid only for a shorter
period of time. As people who die earlier are “worse-
off”than people who die later, market discrimination,
in this case, tends to make outcomes fairer, while non-
discrimination by the state makes outcomes less fair.10
7 A country can turn the stock of national wealth into consumption
(consume its stock of capital) by selling domestic and foreign assets
to non-residents (including the stock of housing) as well as by letting
capital depreciate in line with a falling population.
8 Diamond (2004) and Diamond and Orzag (2004) propose a related
exercise, with a somewhat different emphasis relative to our text. See
also Casey et al. (2003) among the publications from “ageing soci-
ety” at the OECD (www.oecd.org).
9 There are some exceptions in the form of specific retirement ages
for some occupations; yet these exceptions often reflect the recipi-
ent’s ability to bargain collectively rather than anything else, and are
seldom adjusted for evolutions in working conditions.
10 An important issue that receives little attention is the treatment of
surviving (non-working) spouses. There are vast differences across
systems and within systems (as in many cases somebody who
becomes a widow when his/her partner is one day away from retire-
ment may receive a much better treatment than somebody who
becomes a widow one day after his/her partner has retired).
Reformers may be tempted to “save money” to the system by undu-
ly reducing the pension income accruing to surviving spouses – just
because these are not a politically well-defined and vocal group in
the national political arena. 
Figure 4.1A related issue in pension reform that is recently sub-
ject to widespread debate is that, in many social secu-
rity systems, people who want to work longer typical-
ly lose the extra pension wealth they accumulate,
while people who want to retire earlier often lose a
greater share of their pension wealth than the one cor-
responding to their foregone contributions. The issue
is how to make sure that the system can accommodate
individual preferences about retirement age, without
either penalising or favouring those who want to devi-
ate from the legal retirement age. 
A more general problem is due to intergenerational
inequities coming from differences in cohort size.
Generations who work and retire in periods when the
old-age dependency ratio is low are typically better off
than generations who work and retire in periods with
a high dependency ratio. Clearly, a low old-age depen-
dency ratio reduces the workers’ contributions that
are needed to sustain a given pension level; alterna-
tively, it increases the pension level that can be sus-
tained at a given contribution rate. To our knowledge,
none of the existing pay-as-you-go systems embodies
an explicit mechanism to correct for these inequalities
– requiring substantial smoothing of consumption
across generations. This could be achieved if “luckier”
generations accumulate buffer stocks of pension
wealth to be eaten up by less lucky generations,
according to a principle of intergenerational insur-
ance (see, for instance, Allen and Gale (2000) chapter
6). Another aspect of intergenerational equity is rela-
ted to economic growth, which tends to make younger
(and future) generations better off relative to older
(and current) generations. 
We think these considerations should be taken into
account when implementing the needed reform of the
system, as financial considerations alone may lead to
an unfair distribution of the burden of adjustment
between generations. 
4.2 Funded vs. pay-as-you-go systems
An important element of the debate concerns the
choice between funded and unfunded pension sys-
tems. In an unfunded system, the contributions by the
young are directly paid to the old. In a funded system,
the contributions are invested in assets and the princi-
pal and return to these assets are used to pay for
future pensions. Thus, under a funded system, the
young are paying “for themselves” whereas under an
unfunded system, they are paying “for the old”. As
shown below, while an unfunded system is an inter-
generational redistribution device that forces all gen-
erations to make gifts to previous generations, a fund-
ed system involves no such redistribution.
The “returns” in an unfunded system are determined
by the ratio between active contributors and retired
beneficiaries. The higher that ratio, the greater the
amount that can be paid per unit of contribution, and
the greater the financial returns from one euro
“invested”in the social security system. The returns in
a funded system, by contrast, are simply determined
by the rate of returns on financial assets. 
Does that mean that if the economy had been under a
funded system from the start, one would not have to
worry about an increased old-age dependency ratio?
Not quite! While under an unfunded system, ageing
of the society reduces the returns on contributions
directly through the ratio between contributors and
recipients, under a funded system it reduces the rate of
return on capital, as the size of savings in search of
productive investment opportunities goes up relative
to the workforce. In fact, one can show that the
dynamic response of the economy to an increase in
the old-age dependency ratio is qualitatively similar
under a funded system and an unfunded system.
Thus, ageing of society would also be a matter of
worry for retirees if pensions had been funded from
the start. There are reasons to believe, however, that
the implied reduction in pensions would be much
lower under funding: for instance, a fraction of pen-
sion wealth can be consumed every year, in addition
to the return on pension assets.11
Moreover, a fully-funded pension system can be insu-
lated by the effects of domestic population changes
on the returns on capital to the extent that capital
markets are integrated, and pensions contributions
are invested in foreign assets – provided the rest of the
world does not have an ageing problem. With inte-
grated capital markets, arbitrage links the domestic
rate of returns to the international rate (note that this
is true even when the two rates are not equalized).
International diversification reduces the exposure of
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11 To assess the qualitative effect of variations in the population size
on the rate of return to capital, consider the textbook example of a
closed economy where the real rate of returns on capital (and finan-
cial assets) is four per cent. Assume returns to scale in production are
constant, with capital and labour as production factors; the capital
share in GDP is 30 percent and the elasticity of substitution between
the two factors is 0.7. Under the assumption of a constant contribu-
tion rate and retirement age, a 10 per cent unexpected decline in the
size of the working population will cut the pay-as-you-go pension by
10 per cent, but it will cut the return to capital only by a small frac-
tion (10 per cent) of four per cent. While both systems are affected
by the population shock, the funded system is obviously much less
vulnerable to adverse demographic developments. EEAG Report 75
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pension fund holders to domestic risk – including
demographic risk.
A funded system also yields a larger level of wealth
and capital than an unfunded one. That is because
social security contributions raise saving and there-
fore net investment in productive assets. Therefore, the
economy is “richer” in the long run than under an
unfunded system, meaning that it has accumulated
more productive assets, implying higher wages and
higher living standards. 
Furthermore, without a social security system, a ratio-
nal worker would save for his retirement and invest in a
well-diversified portfolio of financial and real assets
earning the market rate. In an actuarial pay-as-you-go
system, legal arrangements force him/her to save into
an “asset” yielding a lower rate of return. This implies
a constraint on portfolio investment, such that a com-
ponent of the worker savings has to be put into what
financial researchers call a “dominated asset”, that is,
an asset whose returns are systematically below other
assets available in the market. 
Do the considerations above imply that funded systems
are uniformly superior to pay-as-you-go ones?  The
answer is, surprisingly, no. While all current and future
generations are better off if the economy accumulates
more productive assets (because they get higher wages
during their work life), asset accumulation must be paid
for by foregone consumption of previous generations.
To understand this, assume the economy has had no
pension system until now. If an unfunded system is
introduced, it is possible to pay pensions to the existing
old immediately. On the other hand, if the system is
funded, one will have to wait until the proceeds of the
investments are realised to start paying pensions, and
one is unable to pay pensions to the existing generation
of old. In other words, when one starts a pension sys-
tem, initial tax proceeds are consumed by the old under
an unfunded system, while they are invested under a
funded system. Thus, the initial generation of old
prefers the unfunded system, while all subsequent gen-
erations prefer the funded system. The argument also
applies when the system is initially unfunded and one
contemplates moving to a funded one: some generations
have to invest instead of consuming, and it is impossible
to make everybody better off. If for example one stops
paying pensions and invests contributions in productive
assets instead, retirees obviously lose. If on the other
hand, one increases contributions to finance existing
pension claims, while at the same investing in a funded
system to pay for future pensions, current generations of
workers lose, relative to the status quo, as they have to
pay twice: once for the old, once for themselves. 
In fact, the pay-as-you-go pension system can be
interpreted as an intergenerational redistribution
device: the gifts to the first generation of retirees
(receiving a pension without having contributed to the
system) are fully matched by losses of later genera-
tions – who receive a rate of return below the market
rate of interest.12 The difference between the market
rate of return, and the lower return granted by the
social security system can be interpreted as an implic-
it tax that all future generations have to pay. The pre-
sent value of this implicit tax is equal to the gains of
the first generation (see Box 4.2).13
In general, at each point in time the implicit pension
debt in terms of the then-existing pension claims is
equal to the present value of implicit taxes yet to be
paid by future generations of participants. This has
important fiscal implications when an economy
chooses to move from an unfunded to a funded sys-
tem without negating the existing pension claims:
such a reform requires an immediate redemption of
the implicit debt by levying an explicit tax, and/or
issuing explicit debt. If the choice is to finance the
transition with a tax, the revenue from such a tax is
equal, in present value terms, to the current and
future revenues from the tax previously implicit in the
pay-as-you security system. Then, the move just con-
centrates the time path of implicit taxes on the transi-
tion generation without changing the size of the tax
burden in present value terms.14
So, while in the long-run the funded system yields
more wealth and capital accumulation, transition
12 As is well known, intergenerational redistribution is an advantage
if the economy is “dynamically inefficient”, i.e. it has over-accumu-
lated capital. In this case, it has been shown that the pay-as-you-go
system can increase consumption of all generations, by making the
currently old generation “eat” the capital stock (the same could be
achieved by granting transfers to the current generation, financed
with the accumulation of public debt).  Note that the implicit (or
explicit) accumulation of public debt would not correspond to an
increase in the debt to GDP ratio, as long as the interest rate is lower
than the growth rate: in such a situation the rate of debt accumula-
tion is slower than growth.  A situation of dynamic inefficiency is
more likely, the greater the population growth rate and the lower its
productivity.
13 While the pay-as-you-go system obviously is not inherently inferi-
or to a funded system when it offers a rate of return below the mar-
ket rate of interest, there may be periods in which the growth rate is
above the market rate of interest. The 1960s may have been such a
period. However, economists tend to be quite sceptical about the
idea that a negative difference between the rate of interest and the
rate of growth could last forever. If this were the case, one may argue
that the price of assets whose returns tend to match aggregate growth
rate (for instance, land) would be infinite (or indeterminate). People
would feel so rich that no one would think it necessary to save: thus
the over-accumulation of capital would disappear, driving the return
to capital above the rate of growth.
14 See Sinn (2000) for the general proofs. See also Fenge and Werding
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Box 4.2
Shifting to a fully funded system cannot improve everybody’s welfare: an example
It is sometimes heard that the transition to a fully funded system would pay for itself, because the contributions enjoy a
greater rate of return than under an unfunded system. As discussed in the text, this argument is incorrect, as one
generation must necessarily lose. A simple example will make this very clear, following Sinn (2000). In a pay-as-you-go
system, a worker’s contributions to the system earn an ‘internal’ rate of return that can be easily calculated as the rate
that equates the value of contributions C to the future pension benefits P
where i denotes the “internal rate of return” of the pay-as-you-go system, referred to the entire lifespan of an individual,
rather than to a single year. Since future pensions are paid with the contributions of future workers, the internal rate of 
return is just the rate of growth of total contributions from one generation of workers to another – proportional to the
rate of growth of the economy. In the last decades, the yearly average of this rate has been of the order of two per cent,
with some fluctuations depending on the growth rate of the economy (and also some disparity across individuals in the
same generation).
Now, if the worker could invest his/her retirement savings S in the financial markets, these would gain the market rate r.
Thus, we can calculate the amount of saving invested in the market that would yield the same pension wealth P as
follows:
An estimate of the average yearly market rate is of the order of four per cent, twice as much as the internal rate of
return of social security. Obviously, with these rates it will take much less resources to guarantee a pension P with the
fully funded system. Roughly: for a working life of 35–40 years, if the yearly return is four per cent for r and two per cent
for i,t h e nS is about one half of C. The alleged efficiency of the fully funded system stems from this simple
consideration.
But let us think of a fundamental difference between the two systems. In a fully-funded system, every generation
accumulates its pension assets. In a pay-as-you-go system, the first generation of old people that receive their pension
financed by active workers receive a “gift.” Thus, the contribution C paid by a worker to the social security system is the
sum of an implicit tax T used to finance the initial “gift” when the system was set up, plus savings for retirement, S.S u c h
a tax component is just the difference between the contribution to the pay-as-you-go system and the amount of saving S
which would yield a pension as high as P at market rates
T = C – S
w h o s es i z ei sd i r e c t l yr e l a t e dt ot h ed i f f e r e n c eb e t w e e ni and r. It is not difficult to see that the sum of the tax payments
T over all generations contributing to the system is equal, in present discounted value, to the initial gift to the first
generation of pensioners in the system. Denote by P0 the pension received by the first generation of retired people when
the pay-as-you-go system is introduced, financed by the contribution Cl by the first generation of workers in the system
P0 = Cl
Assume that, after that, the pension P paid to each generation of retired people is also equal to the contribution paid by
the current young people, although pensions are no longer a gift: each worker contributes into the system expecting to
be rewarded in the future. So the first generation of workers who pays social security contributions equal to Cl expects
pensions as high as Pl = C2, where the subscript 2 indicates the second generation of workers in the system. Hence we
can write
Since this is true also for the second generation of workers and so on we can write
Because the growth rate of contributions (= pensions) in a pay-as-you-go system is linked to the economy’s growth rate,
and is therefore lower than the market rate of return, the last term vanishes when we consider a long horizon n.H e n c e
the initial net transfer when the system was created is exactly equal, in present value terms, to the cash flow that can be
attributed to the tax component of the social security contribution; that is, T = S x( r–i).
Obviously, a pay-as-you-go system is an intergenerational redistribution device with a strict present value equivalence
between all gains and all losses. This is bad news for those who believe in a low cost and easy transition from a pay-as-
you-go to a funded system on the basis of superior efficiency of the latter. It can be shown that, at each point in time, the
implicit pension debt in terms of the then-existing pension claims, is equal to the present value of all future implicit
taxes. Suppose that a country decides to move from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded system, financing the current
pension payments by issuing public debt. This would make the implicit debt an explicit one. Government solvency
requires explicit tax revenue to increase against the explicit public debt. The present value of the explicit taxes necessary
to service the explicit debt is exactly equal in present value terms to the implicit taxes in an ongoing pay-as-you-go
pension system. Thus nothing can be gained in present value terms by moving from one system to the other. It would
even be possible with an appropriate borrowing strategy to choose a time path of the explicit tax fully in line with the
implicit pay-as-you-go taxes. This is just another aspect of the equivalence between pay-as-you-go pensions and debt 
discussed in the text.
C . (l+i) = P
S =  P
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from one system to the other involves trade-offs: mov-
ing from one system to another implicitly, and
inevitably, redistributes welfare among generations. 
4.3 Fiscal budget process and pension reforms
An important caveat in assessing the difference
between pension systems is that one has a truly fund-
ed system only if contributions ultimately finance
productive assets. One can show that an unfunded
system is equivalent to public debt. That is not sur-
prising: public debt is held by current generations,
who buy it (the equivalent of their contributions), and
it is paid back, with interest, by future generations
who pay taxes (thus these taxes are equivalent to
future generations’ contributions, while repayments
are equivalent to pensions). Thus there is no differ-
ence between issuing public debt to give money to the
existing retirees, and setting up a pay-as-you go sys-
tem. Consequently, if one has a funded system where
contributions are invested in newly issued public debt
(i.e., correspond to a fiscal deficit), it is in fact not dif-
ferent from an unfunded system. The counterpart of
contributions is in the form of government expendi-
tures rather than productive capital, and it is the taxes
paid for by future generations, rather than the return
to the investment, that provide the basis of future
pensions. The problem would be slightly less severe if
pension contributions matched new public capital
(rather than public consumption), but this is unlikely
to be a plausible scenario, given the limited role
played by public expenditures on public capital in a
typical fiscal budget. 
To sum up: a funded system whose counterpart is
public debt is indeed not funded at all, in the sense
that the consumption possibilities of future genera-
tions will be no different from what an equivalent pay-
as-you-go system would have yielded. It follows that
the goal of promoting capital accumulation could be
pursued, instead of moving to a funded system, by
reducing public debt. A fiscal consolidation would
have the same effect on capital. In this sense, the
trade-off between pay-as-you go and funded systems
is not particularly important from a macroeconomic
perspective, as there are alternative fiscal strategies to
pursue similar macroeconomic goals. However, the
two systems have quite different properties from a
political and distributional viewpoint. The pay-as-
you-go system typically leaves less room for individual
choice (if workers were allowed to decide to con-
tribute less, the system could not meet the claims of
the old), and is therefore more politicised. It automat-
ically encounters financing problems when the popu-
lation becomes older and there is a political conflict
between generations over how to fix the pension sys-
tem’s budget. Each generation wants taxes to be
increased immediately after it has retired. Under a
funded system, that conflict can be solved by market
forces alone, as equilibrium between supply and
demand determines the change in pension levels – that
is rates of return adjust downwards for investment
opportunities to absorb the increase in savings
brought about by ageing. If people can freely deter-
mine how much they contribute and when they retire,
these variables will adjust as well; for example, if rates
of return fall, people will decide to work a little bit
longer to offset the adverse effects on their pensions. 
A funded system does away with collective decision-
making and relies on individual decisions and market
mechanisms to absorb demographic shocks. While the
political conflict is avoided, it is not clear that the
resulting allocation of the burden between genera-
tions is “fair”. Small cohorts, for example, will benefit
from both higher wages (because they will work with
the capital accumulated by previous, more numerous
generations) and a higher return on capital (because
their savings will be invested in productive assets that
will be operated by the more numerous, subsequent
generations), so they will be disproportionately better
off relative to other generations. Under a pay-as-you-
go system, they will command less political influence,
and have to pay the pensions of the larger previous
generation. Therefore, they will have to contribute
more when active (for both reasons) and perhaps even
get lower pensions when old (because of reduced
political influence). These effects run against the mar-
ket effect of higher wages and higher return to capital,
and may contribute to even out the distribution of the
gains and losses from demographic fluctuations
across generations. 
4.4. Where to invest contributions to pension funds
Another important issue, when one considers moving
to a funded system, is the assets in which the contri-
butions should be invested. What should the compo-
sition of the pension funds portfolios be? Given that
people contribute during their working time, the
returns to that portfolio should be negatively correlat-
ed with the labour market risk of contributors. So it is
not a very good idea to have an employer-based pen-
sion scheme where a large fraction of the wealth is
invested in the firm’s own shares. Such employee stock
ownership may perhaps provide good work incentives– as a good performance of the firms would raise its
workers pension wealth (although there are free-rid-
ing issues to take into account). But it has very poor
insurance properties, since it exposes workers to the
risk of experiencing both job loss and a capital loss on
their pension wealth should their employer encounter
trouble. Ideally, pension wealth should be invested in
assets whose return goes up when business conditions
deteriorate in the contributor’s industry or occupa-
tion. Unfortunately, as business conditions tend to
move together in all sectors, it is not easy to find such
assets. 
In principle, one should also relate the optimal port-
folio composition to a worker’s age, skills, occupation
and industry, using standard finance tools. At a mini-
mum, a well-diversified portfolio with little or no
assets in the industry where the person is working is
advisable; the portfolio should be readjusted when the
person’s job or labour market status changes.
An important but tricky question is whether wealth
should be invested in equities or bonds. It is often
argued that investment in equities yields a much high-
er return than bonds. However, they are much more
volatile, and can yield a lower return for long periods
if there is a persistent bear market. The following
table compares the performance of two pension
funds: one (fund A) is fully invested in a portfolio
indexed on the Dow Jones Industrial Average; the
other (fund B) is invested in a safe asset yielding an
annual real return of two percent. Table 4.3 reports
the ratio of real total pension wealth between fund A
and fund B, at the age of retirement, for an individual
who invests 20 percent of his yearly income during
40 years.15 While fund A would have left cohorts retir-
ing in 2004 and 1999 much richer than fund B, it bare-
ly makes a difference for those retiring in 1989 (who
lose a bit relative to fund B) and 1994 (who gain a bit),
while those retiring in 1985 are much worse off than if
they had invested in bonds. A key reason is that they
suffered a lot from the bear market of 1971–73, dur-
ing which the Dow-Jones lost almost half its value.
Another lesson from the exercise is that fund A gen-
erates huge inequalities among cohorts: the pension
wealth of workers retiring in 1999 is more than twice
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Pensions reforms as a way to circumvent inefficiencies coming from taxes and regulations
By adopting a fully funded system, an economy can raise its savings rate, therefore building a higher capital stock. One
may argue that, in a closed economy, a higher capital stock is a potential source of net gains for the economy as a whole
because the marginal return on (real) capital is typically higher than the market rate of return, earned on individual
savings. Thus, when one uses the latter to calculate the present discounted value of current and future output flows,
adopting a fully funded system clearly raises domestic wealth that is it drives up the current value of current and future
output.
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the reason for the wedge between the marginal return on capital and
the market rate. If this is due to different tax rates on individuals and corporations, there is a simpler and more direct
way to achieve an equivalent increase in domestic welfare consisting of a tax reform that eliminates the source of
inefficiency.
It should be noted here that the difference in rates of return in the above argument should not be confused with
compensation differences in risk properties of different assets. Clearly, there is no room for welfare improvement
following from these price differences. Appropriately adjusting the discount factor to calculate the present value of
output makes clear that no gain in domestic wealth can be reaped by exploiting them.
A different efficiency-related argument stresses that the social security contribution in a pay-as-you-go system
introduces a wedge between net wages and labour costs, thus creating distortions in the labor market. The above
argument would of course apply in full force if social security contributions were totally de-linked from benefits. If 
pensions were universally granted to old people, independently of past contributions, any payment into the social
security system would indeed be a tax distorting the labour/leisure choice. Most importantly, the incentive to evade
would be very strong: systems with these features are a powerful reason for a thriving informal sector in the economy. It
should be noted that a fully funded system may not be immune to the problem if it is run on a collective basis with
redistribution goals that weaken the link between retirement saving and pension payments at the individual level.
In practice, however, most systems link between benefits and contributions. Clearly, the stricter the link is, the lower the
distortionary effects of social security payments are. This is because a strict link would induce workers and employers to
correctly consider social security as part of the compensation of labour – although deferred in time. Some tax distortions
are inherent in social security systems: first, people are forced to save rather than spend their income as they wish, which
reduces the value of working; second, the rate of return on social security contributions in pay-as-you-go systems is
below the market rate. Yet the magnitude of such distortions should not be exaggerated, as if pensions were not linked
to contributions at all. We return on this issue in Box 4.4 below.
15 We have assumed that this income grows at a real rate of two per
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From this exercise we draw three conclusions. First, it
is unwise to use realised stock returns over, say, the
last ten years, to evaluate the performance of a fund-
ed system in the future. This argument is reinforced if
one further notes that funded systems are likely to
generate a massive supply of savings to the market,
and thus depress rates of return. Second, one should
therefore make sure that a significant fraction of pen-
sion portfolios is invested in safe assets; otherwise,
there is the risk of massive social unrest should the
market turn “bearish” for a number of years. Third,
one should consider stimulating the development of a
market for corporate bonds to absorb the demand for
safe, productive assets that would result from the rise
of private, funded pension schemes.16
5. Possible solutions
We now discuss a number of solutions that are typi-
cally proposed to fix the pension problem. A pension
reform should not only make the system viable in the
long-run by correcting financial imbalances but also
aim at designing it in the most efficient way. That is, a
system may be inefficient even if it is not in financial
trouble, and the financial crisis is an opportunity to
deal with such inefficiencies. 
5.1 Raising contributions
The most straightforward solution, from a pure finan-
cial perspective, is an increase in the level of contribu-
tions, computed to maintain the pensioners’ living
standards unchanged, relative to GDP. This possibili-
ty raises a number of questions. 
First, is it fair? Raising contributions puts the burden
of adjustment on some generations but not on oth-
ers: current generations of retirees will not partici-
pate at all in the adjustment effort. The generations
of workers who will have to provide for the baby-
boomers’ pensions will suffer the larger loss.
Subsequent generations who will provide for cohorts
of retirees less numerous than the baby-boomers will
suffer a smaller loss, but still contribute more than
current retirees. In short, this option may imply an
arbitrary distribution of the adjustment burden
across generations.
Second, an increase in contributions would take place
in the context of already high tax rates that discour-
age employment, investment and innovation.
Increasing payroll taxes further may have severe dis-
tortionary effects on the economy. In fact, some stud-
ies (Laroque 2004) find that for some categories of
workers, one is close to the top of the “Laffer Curve”,
meaning that taxing these workers further would
actually reduce tax receipts. But, as discussed in the
box, the severity of this problem crucially depends on
the design of actuarial pay-as-you-go-system. Distor-
tions can be reduced by designing systems in which
contributions are effectively deferred wage payments,
accumulated at an internal rate of return that is not
too far from the market rate of return. 
A possible argument in favour of raising contribu-
tions is that the cost for workers associated with an
increasing old-age dependency ratio may be partly
offset by the fact that fewer children may mean a
lower burden related to caring and education, i.e. by a
lower youth dependency ratio. However, the extent to
which the cost of raising children falls with the lower
number of children is unclear, because of raising
schooling levels and education costs. Moreover, the
above ignores differences between those who have
children and those who do not, an issue we will dis-
cuss extensively below.
To summarise: we believe that there is some room for
increasing contributions. The adverse distortionary
effects of higher contribution rates in the labour and
financial markets can be contained by making social
security systems more actuarially fair.  But in light of
our previous consideration about the fiscal dimension
of pension reform, governments should be prevented
from undoing the beneficial effects of such a policy by
raising fiscal deficits: increases in contributions
should be matched by equivalent savings in public
budgets. 
5.2 Lowering pension benefits
An alternative route is to lower pension benefits,
which has the merit of not increasing fiscal distor-
tions. Again, if done blindly, holding contribution
rates constant, cutting pension benefits of present and
future retirees has controversial distributional conse-
quences: it is fairer than increasing contributions, as
the burden is spread among all current and future
16 We have argued above that investing pension contributions in
newly issued non-productive assets backed by future domestic tax
liabilities makes a funded system equivalent to a pay-as-you-go sys-
tem. We should stress here that this is not an argument against
investment in government bonds by pension funds. Provided that the
government does not issue new debt (i.e. does not run a budget
deficit), a pension fund that invests part of new pension contribu-
tions in government bonds “frees” private financial resources that
can be redirected towards the accumulation of domestic capital and
foreign wealth. generations; however, it also imposes an excess burden
on abnormally large cohorts – as opposed to increas-
ing contributions that impose an excess burden on
abnormally small cohorts. Also, in order to gauge the
desirability of such an option, one must look at the
living standards of retirees. In the EU as a whole, the
retirees’ median income is about 83 percent of the
median income of people aged less than 65. One may
consider that as a rather high number: while retirees
spend more on health care, they typically do not bear
all the costs of a family (childrearing, housing, etc.).
Furthermore, from a “fairness” point of view, retirees
do not bear the disutility of work. 
One argument in favour of reducing pension benefits
is that declining fertility rates were not appropriately
accounted for in the original design of the systems. To
the extent that a lower fertility rate can be interpreted
as insufficient investment in human capital, current
generations who have not borne the costs of raising
children, on average, should be entitled to a lower
return on their social security saving. But by the same
token there is no reason to penalize individuals in
these generations who do have enough children – an
argument that underlies the proposal to differentiate
pensions by the number of children discussed below.
Overall, we think that there is some room for manoeu-
vre in reducing pension benefits, especially in light of
the fact that the required reduction in the purchasing
power of pensions is only relative: their absolute pur-
chasing power can still grow.
5.3 Raising the retirement age
Another natural option is to raise the retirement age.
This option has been largely neglected until the most
recent reforms. Average retirement age has actually
been falling rather than rising. Yet, from an arith-
metical point of view, such a reform makes a lot of
sense. Average life expectancy at 65 was about
12 years in 1960 (for men) and should be about
20 years in 2040. Thus if the average length of time
spent in retirement were held constant, the retirement
age should increase to 73 in 2040. If one targets the
share of a lifetime (from age 20) spent in retirement
rather than its absolute length, one still reaches the
conclusion that the age of retirement should increase
to 711/2. Therefore, if one had indexed the retirement
age on life expectancy one way or another, the “pen-
sion problem”would simply be non-existent. A recent
British report calculates that from a balanced budget
perspective (using again men as a benchmark), one
should increase the age of retirement to 69 by 2050.17
Instead of increasing, the actual retirement age has
fallen below 60 in many countries, because of gener-
ous pre-retirement policies. For example, the employ-
ment rate of the 55–64 age group does not exceed
50 percent in most European countries, being as low
as 25–28 percent in Austria and Belgium and
34–38 percent in France and Germany.  
Therefore, as far as the arithmetic is concerned,
increasing longevity is not necessarily a problem for
pension systems to the extent that the retirement age
correspondingly rises. But this does not imply that a
substantial rise in retirement age is necessarily desir-
able, or that it is the only policy that should be pur-
sued. The extent to which this margin should be used
clearly depends on whether people are willing and/or
able to work the required extra years. It may be that,
faced with a choice, people would prefer lower con-
sumption when retired and/or during their work life
rather than working longer. After all, the secular
trend of reduced working time in Europe – engineered
by public policies such as pre-retirement and the
reduced workweek – must have to do with the prefer-
ences of the political majority. It remains to be seen,
though, whether these preferences reflect a genuine
taste for more leisure rather than misperception of its
costs. Moreover, incentive for shorter working time
may also be explained by high tax wedges, rather than
preferences for leisure, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
As far as feasibility is concerned, one may ask
whether people are in good enough condition, say
between 60 and 70, to perform jobs. Here the answer
is probably yes. First, most jobs are less physically
demanding than 50 years ago; second, the increase in
life expectancy has been associated with a reduction
in morbidity rates: one is in better health at 68 now
than 50 years ago. Finally, since societies have chosen
to adapt the workplace to make it more adequate for
the disabled, there is no reason why similar steps –
likely to be less costly than for the disabled – could not
be taken for older workers as well.
That being said, by how much the retirement age
should increase is less clear, as it depends on prefer-
ences. In particular, people are impatient and prefer to
enjoy leisure earlier rather than later. This puts limits
on the desirability of increasing the retirement age. As
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preferences and individual situations in that respect
are heterogeneous, we advocate pension systems
where people can trade later retirement ages for high-
er pensions at an actuarially fair rate, making people
free to choose their retirement age according to their
individual preferences.
Nonetheless, given that the pension finance problem
comes from a longer lifetime, increasing the age of
retirement should naturally be part of any solution.
More generally, a higher rate of participation in the
workforce would clearly help. As is well known,
labour force participation is lower in Europe than in
other advanced regions.18 Reducing distortions in
labour markets, which may include making pension
rights actuarially linked to contributions as we rec-
ommend in this report, would therefore be an impor-
tant step in tackling the pension finance problem.
5.4 Growth
The crisis of pension systems due to a rising old-age
dependency ratio is particularly apparent if one wants
pensions to grow in line with other incomes. This is
apparent when pension benefits are indexed to wages:
improvements in the quality of the workforce that
raise wages also raise pension claims. This is why
reducing or eliminating wage indexation of pensions
may ease transitional problems: to the extent that pen-
sions of a given generation of retirees are indexed to
their own past wages, raising the human capital of the
young will raise the tax base but not the claims of
these retirees (only the future claims of these young
workers increase). While welfare across cohorts of
retirees will rise with the standard of living and there-
fore the productivity of individuals during their own
working lifetime, increasing growth will tend to
reduce the pension burden relative to GDP.
Observe that in principle a pension system could be
designed to guarantee only a constant pension in real
terms – perhaps according to an “assistance”philoso-
phy. In this case, productivity growth will induce a
downward trend in the value of pensions relative to
GDP, making it quite easy to cope with the increasing
number of retirees. However, such an option has not
been seriously debated, mainly because it would entail
a widening inequality between pensioners and work-
ers, with adverse social and political consequences
despite the fact that the pensioner’s living standards
would not fall over time. 
To the extent that policies that promote growth
increase the amount of resources available for redis-
tribution, they will also help alleviate the pension
problem. Thus one may consider investing in a bet-
ter educated, high-skilled workforce – endowed
with a higher level and better quality of physical
capital – so that higher productivity would com-
pensate for the loss in the size of the workforce.
However, these policies are no free lunch and
involve a reduction in consumption for current gen-
erations, just like any other increase in savings to
provide for future retirement. 
5.5 Immigration
A policy that is often advocated in the context of
debates about pension crisis is to open up immigra-
tion, to make up for demographic and financial
deficits with new workers contributing to the system.
We have a number of reservations about this solution.
First, it is strange to increase migration for the sole
purpose of financing pensions: one could in principle
pursue the same goal by enrolling foreign workers into
national pay-as-you go schemes without them actual-
ly living in the country. In fact, as argued above, this
would not be different from selling the national debt
to foreigners. Of course, one may want to have a
younger population and/or a stronger production
basis for other reasons. But as far as financing pen-
sions is concerned, the geographical origin of contri-
butions is irrelevant. Given the social strains created
by excess immigration and the controversies it gener-
ates, the pension finance argument does not seem very
appealing. 
Second, immigration is likely to have only transitory
benefits: as immigrants age and adjust their fertility
behaviour to that of natives, a pension finance prob-
lem pops up again. Only if immigrants systematically
die earlier or make more children than natives would
immigration permanently solve the pension problem,
and each of these hypotheses would mean that they
fail to integrate into society, which creates problems of
its own. 
Finally, whether the immigrants’ contribution to pub-
lic finances is positive overall is unclear and depends
on their skill level. While the inflow of young legal
immigrants raises overall contributions to the pen-
sions system, to the extent that they are unskilled they
may also be net recipients from other welfare pro-
grammes such as unemployment or child benefit. The
18 Nevertheless, the corresponding contraction of non-market pro-
duction in the household sector should not be disregarded.net effect depends on the skill composition of immi-
gration and on the structure of the welfare state. 
To be sure, taking in skilled immigrants would clearly
be a positive contribution to public finance. However,
one does not select the skill level of migrants by
decree. It depends on the incentives that they face
when choosing a destination, incentives that reflect
the levels of taxation and social protection, as well as
immigration policy. Countries with a high level of
redistribution in favour of the unskilled are more like-
ly to attract unskilled immigrants.
To conclude, immigration is an important dimension
of policy which should be discussed on its own merits,
rather than being advocated as a mere fix for the pen-
sion system’s financial problems.
5.6 Increasing the margin of individual choice
There are some good reasons to have a state-spon-
sored pension system, most prominently the fact that
a fraction of the population does not save adequately.
However, this argument does not justify uniform pen-
sion systems. Therefore, one of our key recommenda-
tions is to increase the margins of individual choices. 
Pensions should be linked to contributions in an actu-
arially fair way. This recommendation has a number
of implications: People should be allowed to retire at
the age they wish, provided they get correspondingly
higher or lower pensions, at an actuarially fair rate.
Similarly, they may choose to
contribute more or less, provided
they contribute more than a pre-
defined floor. Making pensions
more actuarial also reduces the
distortions induced by the pen-
sion system on the labour supply,
as illustrated in Box 4.4 The
example of Sweden and Italy,
moving towards notionally
defined contributions, can be
interpreted as a step in this direc-
tion: any payment to the social
security system over a worker’s
life would be contributing to
determine his/her pension, reduc-
ing the incentive to evade. An
actuarial system would of course
limit the role of social security in
redistributing resources within
the same generation. But this is
not necessarily bad news, in light
of the evidence on current systems. In systems that are
not actuarially fair it is often the case that the within-
cohort redistribution is highly regressive. For instance,
when pension benefits are calculated based only on
the wage income in the last few years of employment
(or based on the best wage over a few years), social
security systems tend to favour high-wage workers
who usually have steeper age profiles of wage income
than low-wage workers. 
Allowing for this margin of manoeuvre may in princi-
ple generate problems for the pay-as-you-go system if
individual decisions do not square with the system’s
overall commitments. To analyse these problems, we
need to take into account the fact that one euro invest-
ed in the pay-as-you-go system does not yield the
same return as one euro invested in capital markets.
Suppose that an individual decides to retire early,
hence contributing less to the pay-as-you-go system.
If his/her pension benefits are reduced calculating the
current market value of his/her missing contributions,
there is no negative financial implication on social
security. In fact, the government can make up for the
shortfalls in revenues by borrowing from financial
markets a sum that, in present value terms, is identical
to the reduction in individual pension benefits. In
other words, the value of incremental future interest
payments on the additional debt is exactly equal to
the reduction in the individual’s pension claims. By
the same token, the financial balance of a well-
designed pension system would not be affected if indi-




An actuarial system reduces the tax wedge
To what extent are social security contributions as distortionary as a tax on
labor income? To provide an intuition, consider the extreme example of a
hypothetical reform from a system with no link between contributions and
pension, to a system of individual accounts such as the German system set
up by Adenauer in 1957 or the new Swedish one. Keeping the average
contribution rate fixed at 20 percent of the wage, we can easily calculate the
difference between tax wedges in the two systems. Consumption (including
bequests) during retirement will be equal to the pension benefits plus any
private saving accumulated over the lifespan, and capitalised at the market 
rate r.
In an extreme non-actuarial system, pension payments are independent of
c o n t r i b u t i o n s .H e n c ep e n s i o nc o n t r i b u t i o n sd r i v eat a xw e d g ed i s t o r t i n gt h e
labour/leisure choice as high as 20 percent. In an actuarial system, pension
benefits are linked to contributions via the internal rate. The contribution
is perceived as deferred wage income, capitalized at a rate of return that is,
however, lower than the market interest rate. Hence the tax wedge in
pension contributions is less than 20 percent: it is proportional to the
difference between the market rate of return and the internal rate of return
of the social security system. For instance, if the market rate is four percent,
and the internal rate of return is two, the tax wedge would only be two
percent of the contribution rate. Clearly pension reforms strengthening the
link between benefits and contributions in a credible way can lead to a
marked reduction in labour market distortions. This could result in higher
working hours and a higher participation rate (depending on the strength
of the substitution effect from higher wages). As a note of caution, we
should point out however that the overall effect of a reform should be
assessed by considering the entire structure of taxation.EEAG Report 83
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beyond the statutory age would be entitled to receive
pension benefits while still working (say, above 65)
without paying further contributions to the system.
Therefore, as long as changes in benefits are calculated
at the market rates, any shortfall in contributions (if
any) that raise the stock of public debt correspond to
an equivalent decrease in future pension benefits: intro-
ducing that margin of manoeuvre does not jeopardize
the pay-as-you-go system. Note that allowing for such
a margin is equivalent to adding a small implicit fully-
funded component to the pay-as-you-go system that
can be activated based on individual preferences
around the retirement age. Nonetheless, while we advo-
cate the possibility for individuals to contribute less,
and earn a correspondingly lower pension, this should
only be allowed for those whose pension benefits are
high enough relative to the social assistance level.
Simple rules should deter individuals from opting out
of the system and then claim assistance benefits
because of insufficient retirement savings.
5.7 Reforming the labour market and avoiding 
pre-retirement
The pension crisis in Europe is aggravated by ill-func-
tioning labour markets. On the one hand, labour mar-
ket rigidities lower employment rates, which reduces
the tax base for contributions. On the other hand,
rigidities increase the number of claimants for various
welfare programmes. Especially absurd, in this light, is
the practice of pre- retirement, which artificially
depresses retirement age, thus contributing to the pen-
sion crisis. While dismissals of prime-aged workers
are extremely costly in many European countries, they
are almost subsidised for workers near retirement. It is
not clear what the justification of such policies is
(unemployability or “making room for the young”?).
In practice, dismissing older workers with a generous,
publicly financed pre-retirement package is a way for
firms to restore some flexibility in managing their
workforce, in the face of stringent employment pro-
tection legislation. 
Clearly, a comprehensive labour market reform would
help in many ways. First, the burden of flexibility
would be more evenly distributed, and firms would be
less inclined to use pre-retirement. Second, employ-
ment would go up, and so would the tax base. But, even
if such reform does not take place, it would be very use-
ful to eliminate the pre-retirement trap. For example, as
has been proposed by Sinn (2003), one could make
early retirement schemes less attractive by reducing
pension benefits before retirement age in an actuarially
fair way (in line of our proposal), while allowing
retirees to cumulate their pension with a secondary job. 
5.8 Introduce private pension funds
As discussed at length above, the current pension cri-
sis is rooted in demographic problems. The extent of
these problems will be magnified in the next decades,
when the baby boomers will reach retirement age.
This cohort of people is large but has much fewer chil-
dren than the previous generation. The pay-as-you-go
pension system is based on human capital investment:
if too little human capital has been formed, it is
unable to provide enough pensions. 
Clearly, pensions come from human capital and/or
real capital. A possible reaction to the lack of human
capital is therefore the formation of more real capital.
To the extent that human capital is missing, more real
capital is needed to fill the gap. This is the rationale
for adding a funded pillar to the pay-as-you go pen-
sion system. 
The argument is not that the funded system is inher-
ently more efficient because it offers a higher rate of
return. We explained the fallacy of that argument in
Box 4.2. The rationale is crisis management by
increasing the real capital endowment of the society.
Specifically a fully-funded component of social secu-
rity is needed to induce those baby boomers who are
now around 40 and will not (or choose not to) have
children to substantially increase their savings for the
two decades that remain until retirement. There still is
enough time to save.
Private pension funds are an effective way of decen-
tralising the additional savings efforts required. The
state should encourage private-sector pension
schemes by certifying that these are sound, as well as
advise people to invest in assets with an appropriate
risk structure. This may involve a deterrent from
employer-based pension schemes and a stimulus to
pension schemes with a broad, diversified portfolio.
We have also seen that despite the higher average
return on stocks, pension funds fully invested in them
would have a return that fluctuates widely across
cohorts. Therefore, there should be a minimum frac-
tion in private pension schemes that have to be invest-
ed in safe assets. 
Simple legal rules should also be designed to super-
vise and regulate fund management so as to min-imise budget risks and social costs associated with
financial instability and moral hazard in financial
markets. These rules should also provide strong
incentives to contain the managing costs of pension
funds. Especially in the initial phase of a reform,
these costs may levitate in a privatised system
because of aggressive advertising by an excessive
number of providers.
Contributions to the fund should be mandatory in
order to prevent free riding on the generosity of soci-
ety. As long as there are other safeguards against
poverty in old age, such as a general system of social
aid, private incentives to save may not be sufficient:
when deciding how much to save, low-income individ-
uals will know that social aid will be lower, the larger
the funds accumulated. If households are guaranteed
a minimum level of income via public transfers, par-
ticipation in funded pension plans should be manda-
tory, to prevent possibly large distortions on savings
behaviour. 
5.9 Differentiating pensions by the number of children 
Above we have advocated the introduction of manda-
tory pension funds in addition to the current pay-as-
you-go system to increase savings by the baby
boomers. Forcing people to save more may be seen as
a burden: many may consider such a burden unfair,
arguing that they already paid for their old-age pen-
sion by contributing to the pension system. However,
this argument is quite weak, once it is taken into
account that, on average, such a generation has sub-
stantially reduced, or avoided altogether, the burden
of raising children. Since many individuals have cho-
sen not to have children, i.e. not to invest in human
capital, it is fair to require them to sustain a compen-
satory burden in terms of additional savings towards
investment in real capital. 
While the rationale of the above argument applies for
the generation of baby boomers as a whole, a well-
designed policy reform inspired by it must take into
account differences within such a generation. After all
there are still families with children. These then run
the risk of bearing three different burdens. They nour-
ish the generation of their parents with their pay-as-
you-go contributions; they have borne the cost of
raising their children, thus safeguarding future pay-
as-you-go systems; and they may face the burden of
additional indifferentiated mandatory saving plans, as
pension systems are reformed along the lines dis-
cussed in our chapter.
To avoid a triple burden for workers with children,
pension reforms could differentiate according to the
number of children. A simple way to implement this
is to make savings plans mandatory only for childless
workers. 
To be concrete: the contribution rates in the current
European pension systems could be frozen despite the
adverse demographic development. Other things equal,
then, constant contribution rates, will substantially
reduce replacement rates: as the old-age dependency
ratio doubles in thirty years’time, the replacement rates
will be cut in half unless other measures to alleviate the
problem are taken. To compensate for the decline in
replacement rates two new pillars of the pension system
could be introduced. One pillar is the mandatory sav-
ings plan as described above. Another is a supplemen-
tary pay-as-you-go pension for parents financed with a
general income tax – a “child pension”.19
According to this proposal, every person entering the
labour force participates in the mandatory savings
plan. As soon as a child is born, the savings obligation
is reduced by some fraction, while the same fraction
of accumulated savings is paid out to the individual.
The same happens when a second child is born, and
so on, until some target number of children is
reached. 
Such a “child pension” compensates for the missing
participation of parents in the funded pension
scheme. The size of the child pension should be
designed such that it ensures today’s replacement rate
when all pension elements are taken together: the pen-
sion from the existing pay-as-you-go system, the fund-
ed pension and the child pension. 
Basically this plan means differentiating pay-as-you-
go pensions by the number of children and compen-
sating the pension gap for the childless with mandato-
ry private savings. The plan is fair because it reduces
the extent to which the fruits of human capital invest-
ment are socialised by the public pension system. The
plan may even contribute to revitalise the desire to
have children. 
Nonetheless, it should be made clear that increasing
the fertility rates will not really help solve the immi-
nent pension crisis in the 2030s. For this the policy
would come too late. However, in the longer run, the
pension system and the European society as such will
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only be able to function better if the population size
can be stabilised. Our proposal may help achieve that
goal. 
Other measures that may also help achieve the same
goal are special child benefits in the tax system or gov-
ernment-financed child-care facilities. These measures
implicitly follow the logic of double interventions:
given that the fruits of human capital investment are
socialised with the pension system, the investment
outlay is socialised too. 
6. Conclusions
In this chapter, we have assessed the demographic
challenge to the European pension systems that in
most countries are based on the pay-as-you-go princi-
ple. Under current conditions, most pay-as-you-go
pension systems in Europe are not sustainable: the
old-age dependency ratios are forecasted to grow from
the current 0.2–0.3 range to as high as 0.4–0.68 pen-
sioners per worker in 2050, which would eventually
require a very large increase in tax rates, and/or a
reduction in pensions. Reform is required and it
should aim not only at fixing the budget problem but
also at designing a more efficient pension system.
A general slowdown in the growth of living standards
associated with ageing is inevitable. Pension reform
that entails a move to a partially funded system (in
which workers make savings in personal accounts
toward their future pensions) will not avoid the slow-
down and cannot benefit all generations. However,
such a move may help stimulate national savings and
smooth the pension burden across generations. 
The pension crisis results from a lack of human capi-
tal. Partial funding means filling the human capital
gap with real capital. It thus helps mitigate the provi-
sion crisis to be expected when the baby boomers
receive their pensions. Funded pension components
may also increase the room for individual flexibility
by allowing people to choose their pension level and
retirement age at an actuarially fair rate, and thus alle-
viate political conflicts associated with ageing. 
One should ensure that private pension funds have an
appropriate risk structure. That includes limiting
exposure to stock market fluctuations and minimising
the correlation between the financial risk of pension
wealth and labour market risk. Thus portfolios of
pension funds should be adequately diversified, with a
critical mass of risk-free assets and a very limited
exposure to assets in the firm and sector in which the
worker is employed. Simple legal rules should be
designed to supervise and regulate fund management
so as to minimise budget risks and social costs associ-
ated with financial instability and moral hazard in
financial markets. These rules should also provide
strong incentives to contain the managing costs of
pension funds. Especially in the initial phase of a
reform, these costs may rise in a privatised system
because of aggressive advertising by an excessive
number of providers. The introduction of an individ-
ually based, privately managed, funded pillar of the
pension system would allow for a great deal of indi-
vidual flexibility, provided it satisfies these require-
ments. It would be a good idea for those European
countries that have not already done so to comple-
ment the existing pay-as-you-go system with such a
pillar.
A number of other margins of manoeuvre also exist
that would contribute to fixing the problem of sus-
tainability of the pension system. To the extent that
part of ageing is due to an increase in life expectancy
and that people are healthier, it is perfectly natural to
raise the retirement age, which has trended down-
wards for many years in most countries. Pre-retire-
ment schemes that are meant to artificially reduce
unemployment statistics, while increasing the burden
on pensions, should be avoided altogether. Structural
reform in the labour market, although desirable in its
own right, will also have a positive effect on pension
finance by increasing employment, thus increasing the
tax base for contributions.
The fiscal system could be amended so as to reduce its
distortionary impact on people’s decisions to have
children. Specifically, when deciding on the number of
children, people ignore the fiscal benefits brought by
children to society in the form of contributions to
pensions and may therefore have fewer children than
is socially desirable. One could envisage reforms to
address this issue. A partial indexation of pay-as-you-
go pension claims on the number of children is one
possibility. Additional self-financed mandatory fund-
ed pensions for those who have no or only few chil-
dren could then supplement the pay-as-you-go pen-
sion for those with no or only few children. People
who do not raise children have, on average, more
funds to save for their old-age pension. Alternatively,
personal income taxation can be differentiated
according to the number of children and systems of
child allowance be used to provide stronger incentivestowards having children. However, there are reasons
to believe these alternative measures to be less effec-
tive in addressing the distortions that undermine the
viability of social security system, contributing to the
substantial drop in fertility experienced in our coun-
tries. Much of our future welfare, and the welfare of
our children and offspring, is at stake with the current
pension reforms.
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